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Mr. Frege, The Platonist

Although Frege is one of the prominent figureheads of analytic philosophy, it is not surprising that there are still issues surrounding his views, interpreting them, and labeling them. Frege's view on numbers is typically termed as Platonistic or at least a type of Platonism (Reck, 2005). Still, the term 'Platonism' has views and assumptions ascribed to it that may be misleading and leads to mischaracterizations of Frege's outlook on numbers and ideas. So, clarification of the term 'Platonism' is required to portray Frege's views more accurately (Reck, 2005). This clarification gives us a better picture of what Frege is interested in and what he does not emphasize. Moreover, in such a clarifying process, we find that Frege draws heavy influence from Rudolf Hermann Lotze, who is frequently called a Neo-Kantian (Vagnetti, 2018). In Lotze's major work, *Logik*, Lotze has a central focus on validity, in its most general form as he used it, that investigates various related topics, i.e., concepts, language, etc (Vagnetti, 2018) (Lotze, 1888). Furthermore, we observe that Frege's work is so similar to Lotze, it seems questionable to even call his outlook 'Platonism'. Therefore, attributing 'Platonism' to Frege may be a slight misnomer. This paper's entirety is mostly a synthesis of a variety of articles related to Frege, Lotze, and their respective outlooks and the original works of Frege and Lotze that I use to support the view that the term 'Platonism' is a slight issue when predicated to Frege. As such, I include an overview of Frege's treatment in contemporary literature that highlights the usage of the term 'Platonism' and how broad its uses tend to be utilized (Balaguer, 2006) (Burge, 1992). In sum, it is observed that the general label 'Platonism' becomes less appropriate when we consider Lotze in the picture and contrast Lotze alongside Mr. Frege. Overall, this paper is just an explanatory one of Mr. Frege, the Platonist, and the issues of applying the term 'Platonism' onto him as his views are more of a segue from Lotze.

Keywords: Frege, Lotze, number, objectification, Platonism, validity.

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