

What kind of activity was Wittgenstein's philosophy?

— Through analogy with Kraus —

Keigo Shiraki

The purpose of this paper is to show, through analogy with Krause, that Wittgenstein's philosophy was consistently “activity”, and that this activity was an opposition to the forces that modify “reality”.

Wittgenstein's philosophy was consistently “activity”. For example, in the early period, Wittgenstein stated that “philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity” (TLP, 4.112), and he characterized his activity as “all philosophy is a ‘critique of language’” (TLP, 4.0031). In the latter period, Wittgenstein likened his philosophy to a therapy (PU, 133) and the purpose of his philosophy is to clarify grammar (PU, 122).

What kind of activity, then, was this philosophy of Wittgenstein? Baker (2004), for example, focused on the therapeutic metaphor and attempted to clarify it by analogy with psychoanalysis. However, the method of analogy with psychoanalysis is controversial and has not been definitively interpreted. This paper, therefore, attempts to approach this issue using an unconventional analogy. It is an analogy with Kraus's activity.

In investigating Kraus's influence on Wittgenstein, it is first necessary to characterize Kraus's own activities in some way. In this paper, we will compare Kraus with Wittgenstein on the basis of Voegelin (1964) and Takahashi's (2016) discussion of Kraus. The distinctive feature of Voegelin's and Takahashi's Krausian theory is that Kraus's task was to “expose the falsity of the ideological language that constructs the ‘second reality’ and to restore the language corresponding to the ‘first reality’” (Takahashi, 2016, p.219). This paper then applies this picture of the clash of the two realities to Wittgenstein's philosophy.

The conclusions of this paper are as follows. For Wittgenstein, the “first reality” was consistently ordinary language. In contrast, the “second reality” changed between the early and late periods. In the first period, the second reality is the ideal language and philosophical propositions. In the second period, the second reality includes, in addition, dogmatics (including TLP) and language games as objects of comparison. For Wittgenstein, the second reality is only an object of criticism in the earlier period, but in the later period it is both an object of criticism and an important part of the methodology for its Investigations.

The discussion in this paper proceeds as follows. First, in Chapter 1, we will point out that there was an aspect of critique of language in Austrian thought at that time. In Chapter 2, we characterize the thought of Kraus, one of the practitioners of critique of language, as a clash of two realities, referring to the discussion by Voegelin and Takahashi. In Chapters 3 and 4, respectively, we apply the picture of the collision of two realities obtained in Chapter 2 to the thought of early and late Wittgenstein to clarify the nature of his activity.

NOTE

- Baker, G. P. (2004), *Wittgenstein's Method: Neglected Aspects: Essays on Wittgenstein*, Blackwell.
- Takahashi, Y. (2016) *Karl Kraus and Austria in Crisis — The End of the Century, World Wars, and Fascism*, [Translated from Japanese.] Keio University Press Inc.
- Voegelin, E. (1964), *Hitler und die Deutschen*, Manfred Hanningsen (Hg.), München: Wilhelmina Fink, 2009, in: *CW*, vol. 31.

•PU: Wittgenstein, L. (2009) *Philosophische Untersuchungen, Fourth edition*, ed. Hacker, P. M. S. & Schulte, J. Oxford: WileyBlackwell.

•TLP: Wittgenstein, L. (1922) *Tractatus Logic-Philosophicus*, London: Routledge.

(Chuo University)