

## **Title: Wittgenstein's Hinge and Moore's Common Sense**

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### **Abstract**

Wittgenstein's remarks in *On Certainty* are mostly the responses to G. E. Moore's two papers "A defense of common sense" (1925) and "Proof of an external world" (1939). In these two papers, Moore provided objections to idealism and skepticism about the external world by raising his two hands, and stating "Here is one hand, and here is another". It is commonly understood that the remarks in *On Certainty* are a rebuke of Moore's view. For Moore, the basic certainties, our common sense, can be known with certainty. While he admitted that he could not provide a proof for his premise "here is one hand", Moore nonetheless insisted that he knows it, because it is part of our common sense. However, Wittgenstein's perspective differs. He saw the basic certainties, the hinge propositions, not as candidates for knowledge, but as fundamentally distinct from knowledge. They are more akin to Moore's common sense, which we cannot meaningfully doubt or call into question.

This paper is divided into two parts. The first part introduces the basic concepts of Moore's common sense and Wittgenstein's hinge propositions, providing a foundation for the discussion in the second part. The second part then attempts to reframe the disagreement between Moore and Wittgenstein regarding their views on basic certainties as a conceptual disagreement. A conceptual disagreement occurs when the disputants have incompatible views on which concept should be used in a given field or context. From this perspective, Moore and Wittgenstein are actually advocating different conceptions of knowledge to better understand our epistemic practices. We suggest that framing their disagreement in this conceptual manner helps to elucidate the genuine similarities and differences between their views.

**Keywords:** Wittgenstein, G. E. Moore, Hinge proposition, Moorean proposition, Certainty